

DIPLOMACY AND NEGOTIATION

(POLITICAL SCIENCE 3581)



Class Time: Tuesdays & Thursdays, 11:35-12:55pm
Classroom: Henry Hicks Academic Admin Bldg, Rm 217

Professor: **Brian Bow (brian.bow@dal.ca)**
Professor's Office: Henry Hicks Academic Admin Bldg, Rm 301A
tel: 494-6629

Office Hours: Wednesdays, 9:30 – 11:30pm

Introduction

POLI 3581 is a course on the theory and practice of international diplomacy and negotiation. The main focus is on the understanding, assessment, and application of various theoretical lenses for explaining bargaining strategies, processes and outcomes. Among the various themes to be discussed are: the evolution of the institution of diplomatic norms and practices, the nature of bargaining “power” in international politics, basic game theoretic and rational choice accounts of negotiation, and the role of culture and ideas in international bargaining. Each section of the course looks at a small number of abstract theoretical arguments or discussions, and a handful of more concrete applications of those theoretical ideas to specific historical episodes.

Prior coursework in International Relations (e.g., POLI 2520, 2530) is not a formal prerequisite for this course. However, a solid grounding in IR theory is extremely helpful in this course, and students with no background in IR should talk with me about ways they can “catch up” on the fundamentals.

Resources

The OWL/Blackboard site is the main place to go for information about the course, and it will expand and evolve over the course of the semester. Students should have a good look around on the site at the beginning of the term, and then check it for updates **at least** once per week.

Main functions of the OWL site:

- Important course documents like the syllabus and (later in the term) instructions for the in-class simulation exercise.
- Copies of required readings. (There is no textbook for this course.)
- Updates and information from the prof and/or TA to students: e.g., general administrative information, like problems with access to readings or changes to discussion questions; possibly also more important updates like cancelation of class due to bad weather, etc. See the “Announcements” area of the site.
- Submission of some assignments (i.e., term paper, simulation report) and posting of individual and class grades.
- Email system for students to communicate with professor and with one another. Note that the OWL email system is strictly “self-contained”: it doesn’t send email to regular (non-OWL) email accounts,

and it can only be accessed through the OWL site. It is, however, very useful as a way to send messages to the whole class, or to specific groups within class (e.g., for the simulation exercise). Feel free to send email to me through the OWL system, but, for things that are urgent or important, it is best to use my regular email (brian.bow@dal.ca) as well or instead.

Assignments / assessment

Assignment	Due date	Share of final grade
Term paper outline	February 13	5%
Exam	March 25	35%
Simulation participation	April 1	10%
Simulation report	April 8	15%
Term paper	April 15	35%

NOTE that the major deadlines for this course are all loaded into the last month. To manage your workload and avoid end-of-term disaster, you **must** start working on your term paper and preparing for the final exam right from the beginning of the semester.

Term paper (and outline)

For the term paper assignment, you will **choose one well-documented diplomatic episode** (e.g., the Cuban Missile Crisis, the GATT Uruguay Round, etc.), **and use it as a vehicle for outlining and “testing” two or three of the basic theoretical perspectives on bargaining reviewed in the course** (e.g., Druckman’s process model, simple game theory, prospect theory, culture, etc.). Further details about the expectations for the term paper will be provided on the OWL website.

The term paper itself is due on April 15, a week after the final class meeting. Your paper should be about ten pages (average 2500 words, absolute maximum 3500 words). **You will decide for yourself which case study to research, and choose the theoretical perspectives you think most useful in understanding the process and outcome of the negotiations.** You should also offer your own views on the most important lesson(s) to be drawn from your chosen case study, both in terms of the development of general theories of international bargaining and in terms of general advice to diplomatic practitioners.

You are required to submit two copies of your term paper—a hard copy to be submitted to the Political Science department office, and a digital copy to be submitted via the OWL site. Both are to be submitted by 4:00pm on April 15.

Each student must submit a **one-page outline/proposal** for their term paper, by noon on February 13. The outline should be brief and to the point, but it should be presented as complete sentences, rather than bullet points (which are usually too vague). Your outline should provide the following information:

- identify the historical case you plan to examine, being as clear as possible about the relevant players, the issues/interests at stake, and the time period under consideration;

WINTER 2016

- identify the two or three theoretical perspectives or “factors” that you plan to apply to the case, with some indication as to how you might know whether/how each theory/factor is more or less “useful” to us in explaining the process and outcome in the historical episode you’re focusing on;
- list 5-10 of the most promising sources you’ve found so far.

The outline/proposal is not a binding contract; you can change the sources, theories, or even the case itself after you submit the outline. But it is important to get an early start on the paper, and to have worked your way through all of these questions as soon as possible. **Don’t wait until the outline is due to get started thinking about your paper; come and talk with me about your ideas, whether you feel like you are having a hard time with it or not.**

Exam

The **exam** is basically a final exam, except that it takes place before the course is over (it is after the last of the substantive lectures, but before the simulation exercise). You will be responsible for all of the ideas covered in the required readings and in lectures, up to the time of the exam. The exam will be **held in class time, on March 25**. It will only be for **2 hours**, so students can use the time immediately afterward to meet with teammates for the simulation exercise (see below).

Simulation exercise: preparation, participation and simulation report

This class will again be playing a crisis simulation game that I designed when I first started teaching this course (“the ABC game”). The game was originally designed for 30 students, and the course enrollment in the new format is over 60, so we will be splitting into two groups, each of which will play the game on a different day. This will require a little bit of creative room-scheduling, which we will have to talk about as the term goes on...

General instructions for the simulation exercise will be posted on the OWL site in late January or early February. **On March 25, during or just after the exam, I will post additional information on the simulation**, including the basic game scenario, specific role assignments and personal instructions for each player, and some more practical, logistical information. During the period between the posting of this information and the exercise (i.e., March 25-April 1), you will be allowed to contact some of the other players, to talk about cooperative strategies, make “pre-game” demands/threats, etc.

Your simulation participation grade will be based on the quality of your participation in the role-playing exercise, particularly as it reflects your preparation and strategic planning. **Simulation-related email traffic should be done through the OWL system, and should be cc’ed to me**, since review of email traffic will be part of how I assess your efforts (and as another check to make sure that players don’t misunderstand the game instructions...). You should play your role as accurately and effectively as you can, but remember that you don’t necessarily have to “win the game” to do well on this assignment.

After the simulation exercise, you will reflect on what happened in a **simulation report**, which is due at the beginning of class on April 8. This will be a **short essay** (approx. 1200-1500 words), summarizing what happened in the simulation, and why you think it turned out the way it did: What advantages did you and your group have at the outset? What disadvantages? What obstacles to effective communication did you experience, and how did you respond to them? What outcome did you expect, and how did that differ from the actual outcome? Etc.

In your simulation reports, try to look at what happened both from your own “first-person” perspective and, as much as possible, from the same kind of objective, “bird’s-eye-view” perspective that we usually take when we look back on real historical events. Make explicit connections to some of the general theoretical perspectives that we have talked about in class wherever you can.

Simulation reports will be submitted on-line, through the OWL site, and will be “published” there (i.e., posted where all students can read them) after they have been graded. If you don’t want your simulation report posted on the site, be sure to let me know that when you submit it.

General policies concerning assignments, deadlines, and grades

The University Calendar makes plain that “[s]tudents are expected to complete class work by the prescribed deadlines. Only in special circumstances (e.g. the death of a close relative) may an instructor extend such deadlines.” **Late assignments will be assessed a late penalty at the instructor's discretion.** Students who miss an assignment deadline on account of illness are expected to hand it in within one week of their return to class, with a medical certificate in hand, per academic regulations in the Dalhousie Calendar. Assignments not submitted directly to the professor must be submitted in person to the Political Science office between 9:00 and 4:00 on weekdays. (If you submit a paper at the department office, be sure to ask to have it stamped with the date and time.) Neither the professor nor the Department can assume responsibility for assignments submitted by mail, fax, or email.

Plagiarism (intentionally or unintentionally representing other people’s ideas as your own) is a serious violation of academic ethics, and will be taken very seriously in this class. For more information on what counts as plagiarism, and how to avoid it, refer to the university’s academic integrity site (<http://academicintegrity.dal.ca/>).

Students are expected to carefully read the academic regulations in the University Calendar, and to make sure that they understand those which might pertain to them. In order to be fair to all students, all of the University’s regulations, and all of the course policies outlined above, will be strictly enforced.

The grading thresholds are as follows:

90-100 = A+	77-79.9 = B+	65-69.9 = C+	50-55.9 = D
85-89.9 = A	73-76.9 = B	59-61.9 = C	50 > F
80-84.9 = A-	70-72.9 = B-	56-58.9 = C-	

Disclaimer

This syllabus is intended as a general guide to course requirements. The instructor reserves the right to reschedule or revise assigned readings, assignments, lecture topics, etc., as necessary.

CLASS SCHEDULE

January 5, 7	WHAT IS DIPLOMACY?
Topics/themes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Foreign policy, diplomacy, and negotiation • Diplomacy in theory and practice
Required reading	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Harold Nicholson, <u>Diplomacy</u> (3rd ed., Oxford, 1969), ch. 1. 2. Christer Jönsson, “Diplomacy, Bargaining and Negotiation” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons, eds., <u>Handbook of International Relations</u> (Sage, 2002). 3. I. William Zartman, “Negotiation as a Joint Decision-Making Process” <u>Journal of Conflict Resolution</u> 21 (1977).
Recommended reading	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Francois de Callieres, <u>On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes</u> (Notre Dame, 1963). • Adam Watson, <u>Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States</u> (Methuen, 1982), Preface and ch. 1.

January 12, 14	THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF DIPLOMACY
Topics/themes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Essential continuities which define diplomacy • Diplomacy as a way of solving problems specific to time and place • Different “modes” and practices of diplomacy in different historical eras
Required reading	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Harold Nicholson, <u>The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method</u> (Greenwood, 1977), ch. 4. 2. Henry Kissinger, <u>Diplomacy</u> (Simon and Schuster, 1994), chs. 4, 9. 3. Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, <u>The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory, and Administration</u> (Routledge, 1995), ch. 7. 4. Steven Livingston, “The New Media and Transparency: What are the Consequences for Diplomacy?” in Evan H. Potter, ed., <u>Cyber-Diplomacy: Managing Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century</u> (McGill/Queens, 2002). [Dal eBook]

WINTER 2016

<p>Recommended reading</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Garrett Mattingly, <u>Renaissance Diplomacy</u> (Courier/Dover, 1988). • Henry Kissinger, <u>Diplomacy</u> (Simon and Schuster, 1994), rest of the book. • Sasson Sofer, "Old and New Diplomacy: A Debate Revisited" <u>Review of International Studies</u> 14 (1998): 195-211.
----------------------------	---

<p>January 19, 21</p>	<p>POWER</p>
<p>Topics/themes</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does power asymmetry make diplomacy irrelevant? • How do big states get what they want from small states? How do small states get what they want from big states?
<p>Required reading</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Thucydides, "The Melian Dialogue," from <u>History of the Peloponnesian War</u> (Penguin, 1979). 2. Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies" <u>Foreign Policy</u> 2 (1971). 3. G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order," <u>International Security</u> 23 (1998). 4. Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall, "Power in International Politics," <u>International Organization</u> 59 (2005).
<p>Recommended reading</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I. William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, "The Study of Power and the Practice of Negotiation," in Zartman and Rubin, eds., <u>Power and Negotiation</u> (Michigan, 2000), but only skim after the middle of p. 14. • William Mark Habeeb, <u>Power and Tactics in International Negotiation</u> (Johns Hopkins, 1988), chs. 2, 4. • G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power" <u>International Organization</u> 44 (1990). • Thomas Risse-Kappen, <u>Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy</u> (Princeton, 1995). • John Ravenhill, "Cycles of Middle Power Activism: Constraint and Choice in Australian and Canadian Foreign Policies," <u>Australian Journal of International Affairs</u> 52 (1998).

January 26, 28	RATIONAL CHOICE, PART 1: SIMPLE STRATEGIC BARGAINING
Topics/themes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Negotiation as rational/strategic choice • Assessing and modifying “utilities”
Required reading	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Thomas C. Schelling, “An Essay on Bargaining” in <u>The Strategy of Conflict</u> (Harvard, 1960). 2. Kenneth A. Oye, “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies” <u>World Politics</u> 38 (1985). 3. Arthur Stein, “The Politics of Linkage” <u>World Politics</u> 33 (1980). 4. R. Harrison Wagner, “Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence” <u>International Organization</u> 42 (1988).
Recommended reading	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fred C. Ikle and Nathan Leites, “Political Negotiation as a Process of Modifying Utilities” <u>Journal of Conflict Resolution</u> 6 (1962). • Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, <u>Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-Making and System Structure in International Crises</u> (Princeton, 1978), chs. 1-2. • James K. Sebenius, “Negotiation Analysis: A Characterization and Review” <u>Management Science</u> 38 (1992): 18-38. • Thomas C. Schelling, “The Diplomacy of Violence” in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, eds., <u>International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues</u> (4th ed., Harper Collins, 1996). • Steven J. Brams, <u>Negotiation Games: Applying Game Theory to Bargaining and Arbitration</u> (Routledge, 2003), chs. 4, 5.

February 2, 4	RATIONAL CHOICE, PART 2: COMPLEX STRATEGIC BARGAINING
Topics/themes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Domestic politics as constraint, leverage, complication • Re-thinking the relationship between I.R. theory and diplomacy
Required reading	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games” <u>International Organization</u> 42 (1988). 2. Janice Gross Stein, “The Political Economy of Security Agreements: The Linked Costs of Failure at Camp David” in Harold K. Jacobsen,

WINTER 2016

	<p>et al., eds., <u>Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics</u> (California, 1993). [Dal eBook]</p> <p>3. James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audience Costs and the Escalation of Disputes" <u>American Political Science Review</u> 88 (1994).</p> <p>4. James D. Morrow, "Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining" <u>International Studies Quarterly</u> 36 (1992).</p>
Recommended reading	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • James K. Sebenius, "Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties" <u>International Organization</u> 37 (1983). • Frederick W. Mayer, "Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side-Payments" <u>International Organization</u> 46 (1992). • Jeffrey W. Knopf, "Beyond Two-Level Games," <u>International Organization</u> 47 (1993).

February 9, 11	CASE STUDY: THE RISE OF CHINA
Topics/themes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hegemonic transitions • Rivalry and accommodation • Trust and stability
Required reading	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Robert Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War," <u>Journal of Interdisciplinary History</u> 18 (1988): 591-613. 2. Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, "After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order in an Era of US Decline," <u>International Security</u> 36 (2011): 41-72. 3. Jonathan Kirshner, "The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China," <u>European Journal of International Relations</u> 18 (2012): 53-75. 4. Avery Goldstein, "First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in US-China Relations," <u>International Security</u> 37 (2013): 49-89.
Recommended reading	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thomas J. Christensen, "Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and US Policy toward East Asia." <u>International Security</u> 31 (2006): 81-126.

WINTER 2016

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thomas J. Christensen, "Shaping the Choices of a Rising China: Recent Lessons for the Obama Administration," <u>The Washington Quarterly</u> 32 (2009): 89-104. • Aaron L. Friedberg, "Implications of the Financial Crisis for the US-China Rivalry," <u>Survival</u> 52 (2010): 31-54. • Barry Buzan and Michael Cox, "China and the US: Comparable Cases of 'Peaceful Rise'?" <u>The Chinese Journal of International Politics</u> (2013): 1-24.
--	---

February 16, 18	STUDY BREAK – NO CLASS MEETING
------------------------	--------------------------------

February 23, 25	PSYCHOLOGY
Topics/themes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perceptions and reality • Rationality, revisited
Required reading	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Jack Snyder, "Rationality at the Brink: The Role of Cognitive Processes in Failures of Deterrence" <u>World Politics</u> 30 (1978). 2. Fen Osler Hampson, "The Divided Decision-Maker: American Domestic Politics and the Cuban Missile Crisis" <u>International Security</u> 9 (1984). 3. Mark L. Haas, "Prospect Theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis" <u>International Studies Quarterly</u> 45 (2001). 4. Jonathan Mercer, "Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War," <u>International Organization</u> 67 (2013): 221-252.
Recommended reading	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Irving L. Janis, <u>Victims of Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes</u> (1983), chs. 1-2. • Jack S. Levy, "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations" <u>International Studies Quarterly</u> 41 (1997). • Jonathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity" <u>International Organization</u> 49 (1995).

WINTER 2016

March 1, 3	CULTURE
Topics/themes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do different countries have different approaches to diplomacy? If so, why? Are these differences important?
Required reading	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Raymond F. Smith, <u>Negotiating with the Soviets</u> (Indiana, 1989), chs. 1-2. 2. Amitav Acharya, "Ideas, Identity and Institution-Building: From the ASEAN Way to the Asia-Pacific Way," <u>Pacific Review</u> 10 (1997). 3. Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness" <u>Policy Review</u> 113 (2002). 4. Costas M. Constantinou, "Everyday Diplomacy: Mission, Spectacle and the Remaking of Diplomatic Culture," in Jason Dittmer & Fiona McConnell, eds., <u>Diplomatic Cultures and International Politics</u> (Routledge, 2016).
Recommended reading	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Raymond F. Cohen, <u>Negotiating Across Cultures: International Communication in an Interdependent World</u> (USIP, 1997), chs. 2-3. • Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," <u>International Organization</u> 56 (2002): 575-607. • Denis Stairs, "The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy," <u>Canadian Journal of Political Science</u> 15 (1982). • Leonard J. Schoppa, "The Social Context in Coercive International Bargaining" <u>International Organization</u> 53 (1999). • Joseph Nye, "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," <u>Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science</u> 616 (2008).

March 8, 10	MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION
Topics/themes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is multilateral bargaining different from bilateral? If so, how, exactly? • How does "power" come into play in multilateral negotiations? • When is multilateral negotiation mostly likely to be successful?
Required reading	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Lisa Martin, "Interests, Power, and Multilateralism" <u>International Organization</u> 46 (1992).

WINTER 2016

	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Fen Osler Hampson, with Michael Hart, <u>Multilateral Negotiations: Lessons from Arms Control, Trade, and the Environment</u> (Johns Hopkins, 1995), chs. 1, 11. 3. Michael Barnett & Martha Finnemore, "The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Institutions" <u>International Organization</u> 53 (1999). 4. Crister Jönsson, et al., "Negotiations in Networks in the European Union," <u>International Negotiation</u> 3 (1998): 319-344.
<p>Recommended reading</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Miles Kahler, "Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers" <u>International Organization</u> 46 (1992). • Christophe Dupont, "Negotiation as Coalition-Building" <u>International Negotiation</u> 1 (1996). • Karen Mingst and Craig Warkentin, "What Difference Does Culture Make in Multilateral Negotiations?" <u>Global Governance</u> 2 (1996). • Kal Raustiala, "The Architecture of International Cooperation," <u>Virginia Journal of International Law</u> 43 (2002). • Norichika Kanie, "Leadership in Multilateral Negotiation and Domestic Policy: The Netherlands at the Kyoto Protocol Negotiation," <u>International Negotiation</u> 8 (2003).

<p>March 15, 17</p>	<p>FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE</p>
<p>Topics/themes</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The relationship between theory & practice • General "how-to" advice for negotiators
<p>Required reading</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Richard Ned Lebow, <u>The Art of Bargaining</u> (Johns Hopkins, 1996), esp. chs. 1-4. 2. Roger Fisher & William Ury, "The Method" (Part II), in <u>Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement without Giving In</u> (2nd ed., Random House, 1996). 3. Mark A. Boyer, et al. "Gender and Negotiation: Some Experimental Findings from an International Negotiation Simulation," <u>International Studies Quarterly</u> 53 (2009): 23-47.
<p>Recommended reading</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Richard Ned Lebow, <u>The Art of Bargaining</u> (Johns Hopkins, 1996), esp. chs. 1-4.

WINTER 2016

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Winston Churchill, <u>The Second World War, Vol. 2: The Gathering Storm</u> (Mariner, 1986). • Robert S. McNamara, <u>In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam</u> (Vintage, 1996). • Allan Gotlieb, <u>The Washington Diaries, 1981-1989</u> (McClelland & Stewart, 2007). • Natalie B. Florea, et al., “Negotiating from Mars to Venus: Gender in Simulated International Negotiations,” <u>Simulation and Gaming</u> 34 (2003): 226-248.
--	---

March 22	EXAM (regular class time and room)
-----------------	---

March 29, 31	CRISIS BARGAINING SIMULATION (location TBA)
Required reading	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GENERAL SIMULATION INSTRUCTIONS – OWL • ROLE-SPECIFIC SIMULATION INSTRUCTIONS – OWL

April 5, 7	POST-SIMULATION / WRAP-UP
	simulation report due April 8 (see above)
Topics/themes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What happened in the simulation exercise and why? • Course evaluations